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I. CODE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS
Law No. 19747 of April 19, 2019 introduced several important
amendments to the Code of Children and Adolescents (Law
No. 17823 of September 7, 2004), especially to articles 117 to 131.
One of these amendments has been the change in the title of Section
I, Chapter IX, now entitled “Protection of Children’s and Adolescents’ Threatened or Violated Rights.”
The amendments, in keeping with the Code’s objective of protecting children and adolescents, provide that:
in administrative and court proceedings for the redress of
threatened or violated rights, every child or adolescent has a
right to: (a) be treated with dignity, considering their age and
their special circumstances; (b) have their opinion, needs,
and expectations taken into particular account, regardless of
their age, with a view to the actual protection of their rights,
* Professor of Law, Universidad de Montevideo (Uruguay). Translated
from Spanish into English by Mariano Vitetta, Research Associate, Center of
Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University.
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observing the principle of progressive autonomy whenever
appropriate; (c) not to be discriminated against based on sex,
age, ethnic origin, race, sexual orientation, gender identity,
financial or social position, disability, or place of origin or
residence; (d) be assisted and represented by a lawyer; (e) be
always accompanied by an adult whom they trust; (f) have
their private life, identity, and privacy respected; (g) be informed about the progress of the proceedings and the possible outcome; (h) receive full redress for any damage, by ordering the relevant agencies to take certain steps and actions
to make up for the rights violated, including, without limitation, the treatment and rehabilitation of their psychological
and physical health.
These provisions apply to children and adolescents whose rights
provided for in general terms under the Code of Children and Adolescents have been threatened or violated. An example of this approach is article 8, which provides that their opinions and preferences must be considered and that they must be heard in all matters
in which they are involved. Another example is article 15(b), which
provides for the protection against any form of discrimination.
Article 120(2), in its new wording, provides: “Children and adolescents must be represented by lawyers. Children’s and adolescents’ opinions, as well as the opinions of legal representatives or
persons in charge of their care, must be heard, paying special attention to expert reports.”
Also, the new wording of article 119 of the Code provides:
Notwithstanding other responsibilities inherent in the position, counsel for children and adolescents shall: (a) interview
the child or adolescent at the outset of their relationship to
learn about their situation, opinion, and needs; (b) inform
and assist the child or adolescent regarding their rights; (c)
hear and consider the child’s or adolescent’s opinion in all
stages of the proceedings and especially when taking decisions which directly affect their living conditions; (d) file
any legal actions necessary to reestablish, protect, and enforce the rights of the child or adolescent; (e) seek and take
into account the opinions of professionals and other experts
who have knowledge of or have taken part in the matter so
that their representation be consistent with the individual
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characteristics of the child or adolescent and their family and
social context.
Article 120.1 provides for the application of the court-ordered
and administrative measures involving children or adolescents established under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
was adopted in the Uruguayan legal order through Law No. 16137
of September 28, 1990. Article 120.1, in keeping with the Convention, clarifies that the following steps will be especially considered:
(a) preventing discrimination based on gender, age, ethnic or racial
origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, and social and financial
situation; (b) promoting life free from gender-based or domestic violence; (c) ensuring strict respect for the best interests of the child.
Article 120.4 includes a nonexhaustive list of steps that may be
taken to protect beneficiaries: (a) registering the child or adolescent
in the education system; (b) registering the child or adolescent in
other education or recreational institutions; (c) providing healthcare
treatment in coordination with government-funded and private
healthcare services; (d) participating in financial-support programs;
(e) participating in family-support programs with the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents (in their own family, in the extended family, or in a family that secures their development); (f)
warning parents or other caregivers so that they address or prevent
the threat or violation of the rights of children or adolescents under
their care and demanding the performance of all obligations they
have to protect any affected rights; (g) securing temporary social
and family orientation, support, and follow-up provided by recognized government-sponsored or private programs; (h) providing
outpatient, medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment in government-funded or private healthcare institutions; (i) taking any
other steps which benefit the comprehensive development of the
child or adolescent. Also, it is established that the court must state
the individual or agency responsible for taking those steps, and this
will be supervised by specialized teams created for that purpose.
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In addition to the steps described above, the law provides for the
possibility that the child or adolescent whose right to life or physical
integrity is seriously threatened may be placed under the care of a
family selected by the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents which undertakes to provide comprehensive protection (article
120.5).
Under article 120.6, all children and adolescents have the right
to voluntarily access 24-hour treatment, care, and accommodation
programs. If the parents or caregivers challenge this, without prejudice to the immediate adoption of measures to protect the right of
children and adolescents, the court with competent jurisdiction will
make the final decision, considering the opinion and the best interests of the child or adolescent.
The institutionalization of children or adolescents against their
will shall only be adopted by court decision based on specialized
opinions by experts in the matter, as the last resort, and whenever it
is essential to preserve the life or integrity of the children and adolescents in question. The maximum institutionalization term shall be
for thirty days, which may be extended for periods of the same duration (article 120.7).
In articles 123 et seq. of the Code of Children and Adolescents,
under the title “Measures Against Sexual Violence and Abuse,” several options are given to protect the beneficiaries of these measures.
Article 123 provides:
Sexual violence or abuse against children or adolescents
means any kind of physical, psychical, or humiliating harm,
damage, or punishment, negligent disregard or treatment,
sexual abuse or exploitation in any modality, occurring
within the family, in an institution, or in the community.
Abuse against children and adolescents also includes their
exposure to gender-based violence against their mothers or
other caregivers.
To protect children and adolescents, all precautionary measures
may be taken which are intended to terminate any sexual-violence
abuse situation, to prevent any possible retaliation or threats, and to
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ensure the permanence of the child or adolescent with family members whenever possible. For that purpose, all measures considered
under article 10 of Law No. 17514 of July 2, 2002, aimed at eliminating all forms of domestic violence, may be taken, especially the
following: (a) restricting the alleged perpetrator from communicating, being in contact with, interviewing, or in any other way accessing the alleged victim or the person who reported the event; (b)
granting the provisional custody of the child or adolescent to close
relatives or any other persons with whom the child or adolescent has
a good relationship; (c) provisionally ordering any persons who are
under the obligation to pay child support to do so; (d) ordering the
removal of the alleged perpetrator from the common home, if any;
(e) referring the matter to the Uruguayan Institute of Children and
Adolescents. Any such measures shall be ordered without prejudice
to any other measures that the court with competent authority on
criminal matters may order with respect to the alleged perpetrator.
II. CHANGES INTRODUCED BY LAW REQUIRING URGENT DEBATE
NO. 19889 OF JULY 9, 2020
The 2019 Uruguay general elections produced a change in presidential administration, as well as the election of new members to
the Senate (31 members) and House of Representatives (99 members). As none of the candidates for president obtained a majority of
votes in the general election held on October 27, 2019, a presidential
runoff took place in November between the two tickets that had received the most votes (i.e., the Frente Amplio, which ran on a leftwing platform and had been in office since 2005, and the Partido
Nacional, which ran on a conservative platform). The Partido
Nacional obtained the majority in the run-off, and Luis Lacalle Pou
became president for the 2020–2025 term. Lacalle now governs with
the legislative support of the so-called Coalición Multicolor (Multicolor Coalition), which includes the Partido Nacional (also known
as Partido Blanco) as well as the Partido Colorado, the Partido
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Cabildo Abierto, the Partido de la Gente, and the Partido Independiente.
After the electoral victory, the president-elect promoted the
adoption of new legislation requiring “urgent debate” by Congress,
with the purpose of streamlining the exercise of his office. That
piece of legislation, passed by both legislative chambers with the
support of the Multicolor Coalition, was ultimately signed into law
on July 9, 2020 as Law No. 19889.
This new law amends many aspects of the Uruguayan legal order: public safety, education, payment systems, among others. Below is a comment of the main changes in the realm of private law,
including adoption, leases, and prescription.
A. Changes in Adoption
The Uruguayan Code of Children and Adolescents (CCT) was
originally enacted as Law No. 17823 of September 7, 2004 and has
been amended multiple times. Changes to the adoption laws had already been introduced by Laws Nos. 18590 of September 18, 2009
and 19092 of June 17, 2013, both of whose provisions had been incorporated into the CCT.
Now, Law No. 19889, in articles 403 to 406, has incorporated
several new amendments relative to the adoption regime.
The Uruguayan adoption system provides for the decisive role
of the Uruguayan Institute of Children and Adolescents (Instituto
del Niño y Adolescente del Uruguay, INAU). This institute was originally tasked with selecting adopting families; any other way of
choosing the adopting family was null.
Law No. 19889 maintains INAU’s important role in the Uruguayan adoption system, but the tendency of the legislation is to
weaken its primacy to some extent. A new article 132.6, CCT, provides that when the court orders the placement of a child or adolescent with a family, whether temporarily or within a definitive separation process, the family shall be selected by INAU. The court may
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only depart from INAU’s selection if it provides reasons, which
must have support from the social workers of the Judiciary, the Forensic Technical Institute, and other experts of the family courts
with specialized jurisdiction. In any such case, the court shall ask
that the INAU experts make a new selection in the same terms and
with the same conditions as in the first case. The most important
change is that the court may now ignore the selection made by the
experts of the INAU Adoptions Department. In this case, the court
shall issue an exceptional decision with grounds when the child or
adolescent is fully integrated in a family, having generated so significant bonds that cutting such bonds would entail a violation of the
child’s or adolescent’s rights, provided that the custody has been
lawful from the beginning, always prioritizing the best interests of
the child or adolescent in the case. In these cases, the court shall
require social and psychological reports from INAU experts or the
Judiciary. After obtaining favorable reports, at the discretion of the
court, the parties may file for the definitive separation and full adoption. The law establishes that if there are any siblings in the same
condition, all efforts shall be made so that they are jointly adopted.
B. Changes in Leases and Evictions
Articles 421 to 459, Law No. 19889 incorporate into the Uruguayan legal order a new regime for the lease of properties destined
to habitation. The key feature of this regime is that the lessee is not
required to present any kind of security for the performance of their
obligations.
The new regime is added to the one established under DecreeLaw No. 14219 of July 4, 1974, which is still in force, albeit with
multiple amendments since its enactment.
The new law also provides that evictions in leases of properties
without any security are subject to substantially shorter terms than
the ones in force in the ordinary regime.

156

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 13

For the contract to fall within the new Law No. 19889, the following requirements need to be met: (a) the property must be used
primarily for habitation, although it is permissible to manage a small
household business, not exceeding two employees, as well as practice a profession requiring a university degree or similar qualification, on the premises, provided that such activities do not adversely
affect the neighborhood by creating emissions, vibrations, annoying
noise, and do not cause damage to the property, and providing that
the activity complies with any municipal regulations; (b) the contract must not provide for any security of any nature in favor of the
lessor; (c) the contract must be in writing; (d) the contract must expressly include the lease term and price; (e) the parties must express
their will to have the lease agreement regulated by the new law.
If any of the requirements mentioned above are not met, the provisions of Decree-Law No. 14219 continue to apply, and this means,
among other things, longer eviction terms than the contract incorporated in Uruguayan law.
The rent may be agreed upon in national or foreign currency, or
in readjustable or indexed units. Unless agreed otherwise, the rent
shall be due every month and shall be paid within the first ten days
of each month, at the place and according to the payment method
agreed upon by the parties. Under no circumstance shall the lessor
demand more than one month of rent in advance (article 422).
Under article 427, “unless otherwise provided in the lease agreement, the lessee shall be responsible for the payment of any consumption, common expenses, or services incidental to the lease.” If
the lessee fails to pay, and the lessor pays two or more months of
national or municipal taxes, consumption, common expenses or any
other incidental services whose payment has been provided for under the law or the contract as a responsibility of the lessee, the new
debt shall be considered indivisible with the existing rent, and the
lack of payment thereof shall amount to default on the rent itself.
Article 430 establishes a special summary action for eviction
based on the expiration of the term in the contract: “the court shall
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order eviction of the property, within thirty days from the day after
the judgment has been served on the lessee.” Under article 431, the
lessee shall have six business days to file any defenses. Once the
eviction order has become final and unappealable and the lease term
has lapsed, the lessor may at any time demand eviction of the lessee
who has not surrendered the property voluntarily, which eviction
shall become effective within fifteen business days from the service
on the lessee of the eviction order. The eviction term may be extended only once provided that the request for extension be filed at
least two business days before the day set for the eviction and the
lessee provides grounds by authentic means of the existence of an
event of force majeure. Any such extension cannot exceed seven
business days.
If the lessee is evicted for failure to pay, the court shall order the
eviction with a term of six business days, beginning from the day
following the day the judgment was served on the lessee (article
439). After the judgment ordering the eviction becomes final, the
eviction shall be effective after five business days since the date
when the judgment has been served on the lessee (article 442). In
that case, an extension of the eviction may also be prayed for, which
may only be granted for a term not to exceed five days.
C. Changes in Prescription
From the beginning, Uruguayan law has followed the trend in
other legal systems and identified two kinds of acquisitive prescription according to their defining elements: (a) “ordinary” or “abbreviated” prescription, and (b) “extraordinary” or “extended” prescription.
Ordinary prescription requires possession, which is the structural element in any case of acquisitive prescription, along with
good faith and just title. When these elements are present, prescriptive terms are shorter (before Law No. 19889, three years were
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required for movables and ten or twenty for immovables, depending
on whether the parties were present or absent persons).
Extraordinary prescription does not require good faith or just title, so the term to acquire ownership by prescription is extended (before the new law: six years for movables and thirty years for immovables).
Law No. 19889 did not modify the required terms or conditions
for acquiring ownership over movables by prescription, but many
changes were introduced in connection with immovables. These
were the main changes:
(a) The possession term for “extraordinary” or “extended” prescription was reduced from 30 to 20 years (current wording of article
1211, Civil Code, as amended by article 463, Law No. 19889).
(b) The possession term required to acquire with just title and in
good faith for the “ordinary” or “abbreviated” prescription is now
10 years (current article 1204, Civil Code). Based on this change,
the Uruguayan legal order no longer distinguishes between present
and absent persons for the purposes of prescription. The old system
considered whether the person against whom the prescription was
asserted was located in the country or was abroad. As a result, article
1205, distinguishing present and absent persons, was repealed.
(c) Article 467, Law No. 19889 includes a temporary provision
stating that any prescription actions which had been brought by the
date when the law became effective would follow the provisions of
the new law. It is also provided, however, that any prescriptions
which are running which, due to the reductions established by the
law, have run or shall run before the two-year term since the date
stated in the section above, shall only run after such term finishes.
Another change was the amendment of article 1206, Civil Code,
regarding “accession” of possessions: “The current possessor may
complete the term needed for prescription, adding to their possession the possession of the previous owner of that thing, by universal
or particular title, onerously, provided that both have started to possess in good faith.” That provision was a source of doubt for
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doctrinal authors, specifically regarding whether or not it was applicable only to the abbreviated prescription or also to the extended
prescription. A third section was added to the article, according to
which that provision is only applicable to ordinary or abbreviated
prescription, and not extraordinary or extended prescription. Therefore, to cumulate the possessions of the multiple possessors to acquire ownership by prescription, in the case of extended acquisitive
prescription, there is no need for all to start possessing in good faith,
i.e., with the belief that the person who transmits the possession is
the owner.
Other changes include amendments to articles 1151, 1215, and
1216 of the Civil Code.
Under the new article 1150(1), “The action to demand the partition of the inheritance expires after twenty years against the coheir
who has possessed the entirety or part of the inheritance in their own
name or as the sole owner.” It is clear that the provision, which used
to require a thirty-year term, now allows a party to ask for the partition of an inheritance (even if the provision applies to any kind of
indivision) up and until the time when the coheir who has inheritance property acquires such property by prescription. The logic underlying the reduction of the term is clear: as the terms for extended
prescription of immovables were reduced, the term to request the
partition was reduced accordingly.
Under the new article 1215, Civil Code, “Any real action prescribes after twenty years,” which significantly reduces the term, as
the term used to be thirty years. However, the provision makes an
express exception from that term with respect to servitudes, which
are extinguished by nonuse for ten years (article 643(2)) and when
acquisitive prescription has run, in which the action to recover the
possession of the thing from which the owner was deprived, ceases
after the term has run for the prescription of the thing (articles 1204,
1212, and 1214, Civil Code).
At the same time, the new wording of article 1216(1), in connection with the extinctive prescription of credit rights, establishes
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that “Any personal action for a debt due prescribes after ten years,
without prejudice to any specific provisions of special laws.” This
provision reduces by a half the twenty-year term that Uruguayan law
used to require.
D. Other Amendments to the Civil Code
Law No. 19889 introduced two changes in the law of succession.
First, article 809(9), Civil Code, was repealed. This section had provided that “persons who are not domiciled in the Department” could
serve as witnesses to a testament. As the article did not detail
whether the domicile referred to was that of the testator or the place
where the testament was executed, the choice was made to repeal
the provision.
Article 462, Law No. 19889 amends article 1075, Civil Code,
which is about the express renunciation of the inheritance. The provision stated: “An inheritance must be renounced by notarial record
executed by a civil-law notary of the domicile of the renouncing
party or of the deceased.” The new wording no longer requires that
the notarial record be executed by a civil-law notary of any of these
domiciles, so the record may be executed by any civil-law notary of
the country, regardless of their domicile.
Article 1561 was also amended by the new law—now, the article
adopts a unanimous position in the doctrine, which embraced an interpretation contrary to the provisions of the legal text. The provision on the absolute nullity established that “absolute nullity cannot
be cured by the parties’ ratification or by a lapse of less than thirty
years.” However, commentators believed that the nullity could not
be cured even by a lapse of thirty years or more, although during
that term the thing that was intended to be acquired through an absolutely null contract could still be acquired through acquisitive prescription. As a consequence of the changes made, the last part of
article 1561, Civil Code, now provides that absolute nullity “cannot
be cured.”

